Haredi civilian service is a structured national-civic program for people who meet its age and status requirements; it is not a general substitute anyone can choose instead of military service. The Bank of Israel’s economic estimate is conditional: it models the effect of a substantial increase in annual enlistment and a corresponding reduction in reserve duty.
The National-Civic Service Authority says its program is for Haredi yeshiva students ages 21–27 who held “Torato Umanuto” status before the relevant chapter of the Defense Service Law expired. Its Haredi civilian-service program lists current conditions and tracks.
Who can enter civilian service
The Authority lists three main tracks: a security track requiring 36 hours a week for two years; a social track requiring 30 hours a week for two years; and a social track requiring 20 hours a week for three years. Its listed entry conditions are age 21 for a married man with at least one child, age 22 for a married man, and age 23 for a single man. The Authority notes that criteria may change.
Placements can be in security bodies, government ministries, public authorities, and welfare organizations. The Ma’alot program combines service with vocational training in areas such as software development, network administration, financial investigations, and fire safety. These are program-specific routes. Legal draft status is determined separately under the Defense Service Law; read how the 2024 ruling applies to deferments.
What the Bank of Israel calculated
In a December 10, 2025 analysis, the Bank of Israel estimated that adding about 7,500 Haredi recruits to each annual intake would eventually add roughly 20,000 mandatory-service soldiers. If that allowed a substantial reduction in reserve duty, the Bank estimated annual economic savings of at least NIS 9 billion, or 0.4% of GDP. It calculated the cost of one month of reserve service for a reservist around age 30 at about NIS 38,000.
The estimate is a modeled scenario, not a guaranteed saving per recruit. The Bank also calculated a possible annual benefit of up to NIS 14 billion if enlistment led to a substantial increase in employment after service. Its analysis of the conscription proposal and non-enlistment costs sets out the assumptions and distinguishes the scenarios.
Military service, civilian service, and employment training therefore have different eligibility rules and outcomes. For accommodations within military service, see the IDF track guide.