On September 6, 1999, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel that the General Security Service had no authority under existing law to use the physical methods challenged by the petitioners. The decision applied the principle that coercive interrogation powers require authorization by statute.
The Court considered methods including shaking, the “shabach” position, painful crouching and sleep deprivation. It held that general government directives could not supply the missing legal authority. The full judgment explains that the service’s duty to investigate security threats did not itself grant coercive powers.
What the necessity defense meant
The Court addressed the criminal-law defense of necessity in the context of an investigator who uses force to prevent imminent serious harm. It said the defense could be considered after the fact in an individual criminal proceeding. That possibility was not advance permission for a standing interrogation method, and did not make the methods lawful as routine policy.
The ruling’s distinction is important: it barred reliance on general directives as legal authorization while recognizing that a specific investigator might later raise a defense under the circumstances of a particular case. The Court stated that the defense could not be used to create an ex ante authorization system.
Legal framework after the ruling
The General Security Service Law, 2002 later defined the service’s mission, structures and certain powers, while requiring it to act subject to law. It did not reverse the 1999 holding by creating a general authorization for the challenged physical methods. The judgment remains the central judicial statement on the legal authority for Shin Bet interrogation practices.
Read how the law structures the agency and how the Bus 300 affair raised questions of accountability.