Counterespionage is part of the Shin Bet’s statutory job. Section 7 of the General Security Service Law names espionage and disclosure of state secrets among the threats the agency must address. The law defines the responsibility, not the technical systems used to perform it.
What public cases show
In October 2024, Israeli authorities announced the arrest of seven residents suspected of acting for Iranian intelligence. A joint account reported by The Times of Israel said investigators alleged that the group collected information on military bases and other sites. Those were allegations at the arrest stage, not convictions; the case illustrates the kind of alleged intelligence collection that falls within counterespionage work.
In December 2024, the Shin Bet said it had exposed 12 cases involving Iranian recruitment efforts, according to The Jerusalem Post. The reported cases involved varied individuals and assigned tasks. These public announcements provide examples of suspected recruitment and collection, but they do not disclose the agency’s full investigative methods or technical capabilities.
Digital intelligence and its limits
Modern espionage can use online communication, digital payments and electronic devices, but the 2002 law does not describe particular cyber tools or authorize readers to infer that every capability attributed to the agency is real. Its public text supplies the mandate; reported court cases and agency statements establish only the facts they disclose.
The Shin Bet’s work also fits within a wider intelligence system. The Mossad identifies its role as foreign intelligence and special operations, while the Shin Bet handles domestic security. See how their public mandates differ and coordination is described.