The Arab League summit met in Khartoum from 29 August to 1 September 1967, after the Six-Day War. Its communiqué became known for three refusals: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. The full context also matters: the text called for Arab unity and political and diplomatic action to recover territory, and discussed economic and military coordination. The Khartoum resolution record reproduces the communiqué and dates the summit.
The declaration set a formal diplomatic position for its signatories at that time. It does not alone explain every later Arab government’s policy: Egypt and Jordan subsequently made peace treaties with Israel. Nor does it describe the positions of all Arab actors in later negotiations.
Camp David ended without a signed deal
From 11 to 24 July 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at Camp David. The three leaders’ joint statement of 25 July said the summit did not bridge the gaps, while calling the negotiations unprecedented in scope and detail. It committed the parties to continue talks on permanent-status issues and identified UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for reaching an agreement.
The unresolved agenda included borders, Jerusalem, refugees, security, and the end of claims. Proposals discussed at the summit were not a single signed Israeli offer accepted or rejected in full. Accounts from participants differ over the terms put forward and why the negotiations failed. The documented joint statement establishes the outcome and the parties’ stated next steps; it does not settle disputed accounts of motive.
Security alternatives entered later talks
In 2014, the Obama administration said U.S. General John Allen’s team had developed several border-security approaches, including arrangements for the Jordan Valley, after dialogue with Israeli military counterparts. The White House described layered border measures and said the work was intended to support negotiations, not dictate a final agreement. This illustrates how security design became a practical question within later two-state diplomacy.