Israel completed its Gaza disengagement in August 2005, evacuating its civilian communities and removing its permanent ground forces from inside the territory. It also evacuated four communities in northern Samaria. The government’s disengagement record gives the completion dates; its plan text describes the policy as a unilateral step and sets out its intended security and diplomatic rationale.
The withdrawal did not settle every question of access or control. Israel retained control over its side of the crossings, airspace, and maritime access; Egypt controlled the Rafah crossing under arrangements with the PA and the European Union. The withdrawal removed Israel’s permanent military and civilian presence inside Gaza, but it was not a negotiated final-status agreement.
From election to Hamas control
Hamas won a majority of seats in the Legislative Council election held in January 2006 and formed a government. In June 2007, after violent clashes with Fatah, Hamas took control of Gaza and displaced the PA’s security forces there. The PA continued to govern parts of Judea and Samaria, leaving two rival administrations. The Israeli government’s 2008 account of Hamas’s takeover documents the chronology and the election result.
Hamas is a terrorist organization that has used Gaza as a base for attacks on Israel. The same 2008 report describes its military buildup, including rockets and underground infrastructure; it is an Israeli government source and should be read as such. The sequence matters: withdrawal in 2005, an election in 2006, and a forcible takeover in 2007 are connected events, but they are not a single transfer of sovereignty followed immediately by Hamas rule.
What the case shows about an agreement
Gaza is relevant to Israeli security planning because it demonstrates that a withdrawal without an enforceable political and security arrangement can be followed by a hostile armed faction taking power. It does not by itself predict the outcome of every negotiated agreement: Gaza’s governance, borders, and security arrangements differed from proposals for a two-state agreement. In 2014, the White House said General John Allen’s team examined layered border-security arrangements, including measures along the Jordan River, for a possible two-state context. Its description of those proposals shows why border monitoring and control of armed forces remain central issues.