The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and restored sanctions. Iran began stepping away from nuclear limits in 2019. In August 2025, France, Germany and the United Kingdom invoked the snapback mechanism in Security Council Resolution 2231; the UN said the earlier Iran sanctions resolutions were reapplied on 27 September 2025.
From withdrawal to reduced compliance
The JCPOA was concluded in July 2015 by Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. The United States announced its withdrawal in May 2018. Iran announced in May 2019 that it would stop observing some nuclear limits and later expanded enrichment and installed advanced centrifuges. The IAEA reports that Iran stopped implementing nuclear-related JCPOA commitments, including the Additional Protocol, on 23 February 2021, while remaining bound by its NPT safeguards agreement. The Agency lays out this timeline in its 2025 safeguards assessment.
What the 2025 snapback did
Resolution 2231 established a 30-day procedure after notification of significant non-performance: unless the Security Council adopted a resolution continuing sanctions relief, the earlier UN sanctions resolutions would return. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 2231 page states that the E3 notified the Council and that, effective 27 September 2025, the provisions of resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835 and 1929 were reapplied. The attached resolution text contains the snapback procedure.
Several states challenged the E3’s right to use the procedure, while the UN page records the procedural result. Those are distinct facts: the UN announced reapplication of the earlier resolutions, and governments disputed its legal validity. The Secretary-General’s Resolution 2231 update gives the official status.
Why verification remains central
Diplomacy depends on reliable accounting and inspection. Following attacks on nuclear sites in June 2025, the IAEA halted in-field verification; its September report said it lacked access to all safeguarded facilities except Bushehr and could not establish the enriched uranium stockpile’s whereabouts with its former confidence. Read the Agency’s monitoring report and the original JCPOA inspection terms.