The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded on 14 July 2015, placed measurable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and expanded IAEA monitoring. It capped enrichment capacity and uranium stocks, restricted enrichment levels, and required redesign of the Arak reactor. The terms appear in the text attached to UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
Limits on centrifuges, uranium and Arak
For ten years, Iran agreed to operate no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges in 30 cascades at Natanz. For fifteen years, enrichment was limited to 3.67% uranium-235 and the stockpile to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to that level, or its equivalent in other chemical forms. Excess material was to be sold or down-blended. Iran also agreed not to enrich uranium at Fordow for fifteen years and to convert it into a nuclear, physics and technology center. The original Arak reactor core was to be removed and rendered unusable, and the redesigned reactor would reduce plutonium production. The JCPOA annex gives the details and time periods.
What inspectors were authorized to do
The IAEA monitored Iran’s safeguards agreement and the JCPOA commitments. Iran agreed to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol and to implement modified Code 3.1, requiring early design information for new nuclear facilities. The agreement also provided monitoring of uranium mining and milling, centrifuge production and storage, and access procedures when the Agency had concerns about undeclared nuclear material or activities. These measures added to routine safeguards. They did not create an unrestricted “anytime, anywhere” inspection right: the JCPOA set a defined process for resolving an access request, with a Joint Commission mechanism if the parties could not resolve the concern.
How monitoring changed
The IAEA verified Iran’s initial implementation; Implementation Day followed on 16 January 2016. Iran ceased implementing its nuclear-related JCPOA commitments, including provisional Additional Protocol application, on 23 February 2021, while its NPT safeguards agreement remained in force. The Agency reported the distinction in its 2025 safeguards assessment. After attacks on nuclear sites in June 2025, field verification stopped and access narrowed further. See the IAEA’s report on the resulting monitoring gap and what the Agency can currently verify.