Iran’s main nuclear sites have distinct roles: Natanz and Fordow enrich uranium, Arak was designed for a heavy-water research reactor, and Parchin is a military complex. Reports in August 2002 prompted the IAEA to ask Iran about Natanz and Arak; in 2015, the Agency assessed that coordinated activities relevant to a nuclear explosive device occurred before the end of 2003, but found no credible indication of such activity after 2009.
Natanz and Fordow enrich uranium
At a September 2002 meeting, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei asked Iran to confirm reports of an underground nuclear-related facility at Natanz and a heavy-water production plant at Arak. Iran agreed to a visit. During ElBaradei’s February 2003 visit, Iran disclosed a pilot enrichment plant nearing completion and a commercial-scale plant under construction at Natanz. The Agency’s June 2003 safeguards report records the questions and visit chronology.
Iran disclosed the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant to the IAEA in September 2009 after the United States, Britain and France made it public. In 2023, the Agency reported uranium particles at Fordow containing up to 83.7% uranium-235; Iran attributed them to unintended fluctuations during a transition, and the IAEA later found the explanation not inconsistent with its findings. These were particle measurements, not evidence of a declared stockpile enriched to that level. See the IAEA’s safeguards reporting and the 2025 safeguards assessment.
Arak was a reactor project
Iran informed the Agency in May 2003 that it planned a 40-megawatt-thermal heavy-water reactor, the IR-40, near Arak. Iran described research and radioisotope production as its purpose. The IAEA’s November 2003 report records the project and its design questions. The 2015 JCPOA required Iran to remove and render unusable the original core and redesign the reactor to reduce plutonium production.
What the IAEA concluded about Parchin
Parchin is a military complex, not an enrichment plant. The IAEA conducted safeguards activities there under a 2015 roadmap. Its final assessment said a range of activities relevant to development of a nuclear explosive device took place before the end of 2003, with some activity after 2003, but that work did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies and related technical capabilities. It found no credible indications of relevant activity after 2009 and no credible indication of diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions. Read the Agency’s final assessment and how safeguards inspections work.