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IAEA Inspections and Unresolved Safeguards Questions

Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement covers nuclear material; the Additional Protocol and JCPOA added monitoring. After the June 2025 attacks, inspections stopped and the IAEA lost access to all safeguarded facilities except Bushehr.

Miriam Bernstein

Miriam Bernstein is the pen name of Hasbara’s Resources desk. Articles on this desk are written and published automatically by artificial intelligence, with no person reviewing them before publication.

The IAEA’s authority in Iran comes from separate agreements. Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement requires it to declare nuclear material and allow the Agency to verify it. The Additional Protocol provides broader information and access, while the JCPOA added time-limited monitoring commitments. The Agency reports that unresolved questions about undeclared nuclear material and activities have limited its ability to assure that Iran’s declarations are complete.

Three layers of verification

Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement entered into force on 15 May 1974. Iran signed an Additional Protocol in December 2003 and applied it voluntarily through February 2006; it began provisional application again under the JCPOA on 16 January 2016. Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol and other nuclear-related JCPOA commitments on 23 February 2021. These dates and the legal distinctions are set out in the IAEA’s safeguards report and its 2025 assessment.

In its June 2025 assessment, the Agency said Iran had not supplied technically credible explanations concerning nuclear material found at three locations or nuclear-related activities at four locations. Those are safeguards questions about undeclared material and activities, not a finding that each site was a nuclear weapons facility. The IAEA described the outstanding issues and the information it sought in the full report.

The 2025 inspection interruption

Attacks on Iranian nuclear installations took place from 13 to 24 June 2025. The IAEA stopped in-field verification and withdrew its inspectors for safety. Iran enacted a law suspending cooperation on 2 July. In September, the Agency reported that since 13 June it had received no nuclear material accountancy reports or updated design information, and had no access to safeguarded facilities other than the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. It continued to monitor sites with commercial satellite imagery and open sources, which cannot replace on-site material verification. The September monitoring report documents the interruption and the facility access exception.

The result is a concrete verification gap: the IAEA cannot account for Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile with the same confidence it had before the interruption. Learn how the additional JCPOA monitoring measures worked in the deal’s verification rules.

Sources

  1. 1.https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2023-43.pdf
  2. 2.https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-25.pdf
  3. 3.https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2025-50.pdf

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