Oslo assigned concrete policing responsibilities, not a vague promise to eliminate every armed organization. The 1993 Declaration required a strong police force to maintain public order and internal security for Arabs, while Israel retained responsibility for external threats and overall security of Israelis. Oslo II added specific duties to prevent violence, arrest suspects, and coordinate security work.
The written security duties
Arafat’s September 9, 1993 letter renounced terrorism and promised that the PLO would take responsibility for its elements and personnel, prevent violations, and discipline violators. The Declaration of Principles then called for a police force and joint liaison mechanisms. Those texts are reproduced in the mutual-recognition letters and the 1993 Declaration.
The 1995 Interim Agreement set an authorized police ceiling of 30,000, divided between Judea and Samaria and Gaza, and required systematic action against violence and terror, including arrest and prosecution of suspects and prevention of incitement. The relevant provisions appear in Annex I and the security articles of the Interim Agreement. The text assigns defined functions and coordination obligations; it should not be paraphrased as a blanket clause requiring immediate dismantling of every group.
The 1974 program and the 1993 pledge
The PLO’s 1974 Ten-Point Program called for establishing “national authority” over territory from which Israeli forces withdrew, then continuing its strategy toward the organization’s broader aims. Arafat’s 1993 letter instead formally committed the PLO to recognizing Israel, negotiating permanent issues, and renouncing terrorism. Those are distinct texts and commitments; setting them side by side reveals a change in stated policy, while their words alone do not establish how every faction would act. Compare the 1974 program with the 1993 letter.
The 1996 tunnel clashes
In September 1996, Israel opened an exit from the Western Wall tunnel in Jerusalem. Violent clashes followed across Judea and Samaria and Gaza, involving PA police and Israeli forces. The U.S. Office of the Historian’s chronology places the clashes amid an already fragile Oslo process; later Hebron and Wye agreements continued implementation. The episode showed that liaison structures did not prevent armed confrontation when leaders made contested decisions and street violence spread.
Oslo’s security architecture depended on both policing and continuing coordination. The crisis demonstrated the consequences when political disputes overwhelmed those mechanisms. The opening of the tunnel did not occur in isolation: the parties were already managing competing security responsibilities and public expectations under an interim system. The agreement created liaison committees to resolve coordination issues, but those bodies could not substitute for political decisions that reduced tensions. The broader interim division of authority appears in Oslo I and II.