Lebanon’s army has been assigned the task of extending state control and restricting weapons, but Hezbollah’s disarmament is not complete. The army’s 8 January 2026 update described the first phase of its plan in the South Litani sector and said clearance work remained underway.
Resolution 1701 called for Lebanon’s government to extend its authority in the south and for the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River to contain no armed personnel or weapons except those of the state and UNIFIL. The November 2024 cessation arrangement made the operational duties explicit: Lebanon’s official forces are to deploy in the southern Litani area, dismantle unauthorized military infrastructure, seize unauthorized arms and prevent arms transfers.
What the army says it has done
In its January 2026 statement, the Lebanese Army said it had achieved the objectives of the first phase of its disarmament plan. It described expanded operational presence, the securing of vital areas and operational control over territory that had come under its authority in the South Litani sector. The army also said operations continued to clear unexploded ordnance and tunnels and respond to requests for action.
The statement set out a phase and an area. It did not claim that Hezbollah had been disarmed throughout Lebanon. It also said a comprehensive assessment of the first phase would guide subsequent phases. The distinction matters: deployment and stated objectives are progress, while effective control requires the state to find and seize unauthorized weapons and prevent armed groups from rebuilding.
Capacity, political will and state authority
Lebanon’s economic contraction adds pressure to public institutions. The World Bank estimated that real GDP fell 6.6 percent in 2024 and that cumulative contraction since 2019 exceeded 38 percent by the end of 2024. These figures describe the economy; they do not measure army readiness. Carrying out sustained border security and weapons-control duties still requires personnel, equipment, maintenance and political backing.
Lebanon’s state-control challenge also extends beyond the southern border. UNRWA’s account of the 1969 Cairo Agreement records the transfer of camp security functions. A 1969 agreement between Lebanese and PLO representatives transferred camp security functions to the PLO’s armed command; Lebanon’s parliament declared that agreement void in 1987. Factional influence persisted in some camps, illustrating the difference between legal sovereignty and day-to-day control. In 2025, Lebanese and PLO officials began a process to place unauthorized weapons under state authority, but that process does not itself demonstrate complete disarmament.
How to measure progress
Evidence of control would include army access to sites, verified seizure of unauthorized weapons, dismantling of military infrastructure, control of border crossings and prevention of rebuilding. The arrangement calls for Lebanese authorities to act; UNIFIL supports and reports within its mandate. A Lebanese state able to keep Hezbollah’s armed units and weapons away from the border would reduce the threat to Israel’s northern communities. See the 2024 arrangement and its enforcement provisions.