The OPCW’s investigation expanded after Assad’s government fell in December 2024. In May 2026, the organization announced that its expert team had found previously undeclared chemical munitions, chemical substances, equipment, and thousands of pages of records. The findings included aerial bombs of a type used in the 2017 attacks at Ltamenah and Khan Shaykhun and rockets of a type used in the 2013 Ghouta attack. The OPCW is continuing work at more than 100 potential sites; that is an investigative scope, not a count of confirmed weapons stockpiles.
What the inspectors found
The May 2026 deployment focused on locations in a broad area between Hama, Homs, and Latakia. The OPCW reported dozens of previously undeclared chemical munitions, separately stored substances and related equipment under technical analysis, and thousands of pages of relevant documentation. The OPCW announcement of 27 May 2026 identifies these as findings from its deployment and says further technical work is required.
The agency distinguishes confirmed materials from sites that may be relevant. OPCW says it has prioritized a subset of high-interest locations from more than 100 potential sites, using information gathered and corroborated over twelve years. The presence of a potential site alone does not establish that it contains a chemical weapon. Inspectors must identify materials, examine records, collect samples where appropriate, and establish what activities occurred there.
Why the declaration is still incomplete
Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013 and submitted an initial declaration of its programme. The OPCW says the former Syrian government failed to declare its full programme and tried to mislead inspectors about its scope. Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) required the elimination of Syria’s chemical-weapons programme and cooperation with OPCW verification. The fall of Assad opened new access for the organization to investigate unresolved discrepancies and locate undeclared materials.
The next steps are to complete the inventory, have Syria submit an accurate declaration of remaining chemical-weapons-related materials and activities, and plan safe destruction under verification. The OPCW has also documented chemical weapons use by the former Syrian military and by non-state actors, including ISIS/ISIL. This ongoing verification matters to Israel because unsecured toxic agents, munitions, and production records could be seized by armed groups during Syria’s transition. Findings and destruction plans will need to be verified site by site; the agency’s current work does not mean the investigation is complete.