Israel and Russia established a military communication channel after Russia entered the Syrian war in September 2015. It allowed the two militaries to communicate around Israeli operations in Syrian airspace and reduce the danger of an unintended clash; it was not a joint command or alliance. The 2018 Il-20 incident exposed the risks of operating in crowded Syrian airspace, while Israeli policy in northern Syria continued to focus on limiting Iranian military entrenchment. Washington Institute account of the Il-20 incident, INSS analysis of northern policy, and Israeli government record of bilateral relations.
Why Israel opened a channel
Russia deployed aircraft and air-defense systems to support Bashar al-Assad’s government. Israel continued acting against Iranian military activity and weapons transfers to Hezbollah in Syria. With Russian forces operating nearby, direct communication helped each side avoid misidentifying the other’s aircraft or activity.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Vladimir Putin discussed coordination during a Moscow meeting in September 2015. The mechanism was limited: Israel retained freedom to act in defense of its security, and the channel did not amount to Russian approval of Israeli operations.
The Il-20 incident
On 17 September 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft during an Israeli strike near Latakia; all 15 Russian service members aboard died. Russia blamed Israel, saying Israeli aircraft had used the Russian plane as cover. Israel said Syrian fire caused the loss and provided its account to Moscow.
The incident exposed how quickly operations in crowded Syrian airspace could produce a deadly crisis. Russia delivered S-300 air-defense systems to Syria afterward. The two countries kept communicating, but the incident showed that a hotline cannot eliminate risk or settle disagreements about military actions.
A practical channel, not a guarantee
The mechanism’s purpose is narrow: communicate to prevent accidental military contact. It does not establish shared objectives, prevent every escalation, or remove Israel’s need to assess threats independently. Russia’s ongoing role in Syria made the channel strategically useful even as the countries backed opposing sides in the conflict.
For the wider relationship, see Russia-Israel relations from Stalin to Putin.