The PLO-aligned Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) coordinated much of the local political campaign through leaflets, strikes, and calls for demonstrations. Hamas, founded in Gaza in December 1987, organized separately around an Islamist program and challenged the PLO’s influence.
Leaflets and organized action
The UNLU brought together activists associated with Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestine Communist Party. Its clandestine communiqués announced strike days, commercial closures, and demonstrations. The Jewish Virtual Library describes the PLO-dominated leadership’s leaflets as calling for escalation and identifying targets. Its chronology and account of the campaign also document violence directed at Israeli civilians and soldiers.
Civil disobedience, including work stoppages and refusal to cooperate with Israeli administration, disrupted ordinary activity. These tactics existed alongside firebombs, shootings, and assaults; they were distinct actions within a campaign that included violence. The campaign’s organizations did not speak for every resident. The chronology records how the factions and attacks developed.
Hamas’s rival Islamist program
Hamas grew from the Muslim Brotherhood network in Gaza and established an organization separate from the PLO-led UNLU. Its 1988 Covenant framed the struggle in religious terms, rejected compromise over the land, and called for jihad. Hamas issued its own leaflets and sometimes announced strike dates separately, competing with the UNLU for public leadership. The rivalry meant that the campaign had no single command or agreed political program.
Killings within the Arab community
Armed groups killed Arab residents accused of collaborating with Israel. Some accusations concerned intelligence activity, while others were used to settle personal scores or enforce factional control; women accused of violating social rules were also murdered. The Jewish Virtual Library estimates nearly 1,000 such deaths from 1989 to 1992. That account distinguishes these internal killings from deaths in clashes with Israeli forces. These executions show how factional coercion accompanied both political mobilization and attacks against Israel.
The diplomatic path that followed is outlined by the U.S. Office of the Historian. For the origins and spread of the campaign, see the opening chronology; for the government’s security policies, see Israel’s response and the 1988 political debate.