Israel entered the Sinai Campaign on 29 October 1956 after years of Egyptian restrictions on Israeli shipping and escalating attacks across the Gaza border, alongside Egypt’s rapid arms buildup. The blockade of the Straits of Tiran threatened Eilat’s access to the Red Sea; the fedayeen raids made the border a daily security problem. These causes explain Israel’s decision, while the secret agreement with Britain and France shaped the campaign’s timing.
Egypt restricted shipping to Israel
Egypt barred Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal after the 1948 war and intercepted cargoes bound for Israel. Security Council Resolution 95 of 1 September 1951 specifically addressed Egyptian interference in the Canal: it called the seizure practice an abuse of visit and search and urged Egypt to end restrictions on international commercial shipping. That resolution concerned the Suez Canal, not the separate legal dispute over the Straits of Tiran.
Egypt also blocked the Straits of Tiran, the narrow entrance from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba and Eilat. Israel regarded access as essential to its southern port and trade with Asia and Africa. The Israeli government later told the UN that its withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh had to be accompanied by arrangements for free navigation. Read the campaign account for how Israeli forces reached the straits.
Fedayeen raids escalated the border conflict
Armed infiltrations from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and other neighboring territories included attacks on civilians and infrastructure. In February 1955, an Israeli raid on an Egyptian army post in Gaza sharply worsened relations. The United States’ contemporaneous record noted that observers believed Egypt’s attitude toward Israel had changed after that raid; later records document Israel’s repeated complaints about fedayeen activity.
Egypt’s 1955 agreement to acquire Soviet-bloc weapons through Czechoslovakia added to Israeli concern about the regional military balance. US diplomatic records show Israeli officials pressed for arms after the deal and described the arms increment as a serious imbalance. It was one factor among several, not the sole cause of the war.
Operation Kadesh and the secret agreement
Israel’s cabinet approved a campaign against Egypt, and on 29 October the IDF began Operation Kadesh with a paratroop drop near the Mitla Pass. Israel’s aims included ending attacks from the Egyptian border and removing the blockade at Tiran. But Israel had also secretly coordinated with France and Britain. Under the 24 October Protocol of Sèvres, Israel would attack in Sinai; Britain and France would issue an ultimatum and then intervene militarily if Egypt did not accept it. The arrangement is essential context for understanding the campaign; the next page explains the Suez Crisis and Protocol.
Israel’s security grievances were real: the UN had condemned Egyptian canal seizures, and the straits closure and cross-border raids threatened Israeli commerce and civilians. The secret collusion nevertheless tied Israel’s operation to the Anglo-French plan around the Canal and gave the intervention a political cost that a strictly Israeli-Egyptian campaign would not have carried.