Israel withdrew from Sinai and Gaza in 1957 under intense US and UN pressure, after gaining commitments and assurances around shipping through the Straits of Tiran and the deployment of UNEF. The United States opposed Israel’s continued presence and warned of diplomatic and economic consequences, including action affecting US financial support. Israel left Sharm el-Sheikh in March after stating that freedom of navigation had to continue.
Eisenhower pressed for withdrawal
Following Israel’s October 1956 advance, President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration pushed for a ceasefire and withdrawal. The General Assembly’s resolutions called for withdrawal behind the armistice lines. Washington viewed an Israeli refusal as damaging to the UN and US policy, and raised economic measures, including the possible withholding of assistance and the impact on Israel’s financial position. The pressure operated alongside UN votes and broad international opposition to Israel’s continued deployment.
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s government sought to connect withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh with arrangements to prevent renewed attacks and keep the Gulf of Aqaba open. Israel argued that Tiran was an international waterway in which ships had a right of innocent passage. It announced that it would withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh in confidence that navigation would remain free. It did not obtain a formal bilateral peace treaty or a binding permanent guarantee.
What UNEF could do
The General Assembly established UNEF in November 1956 to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal. The force deployed between Egyptian and Israeli forces and moved into positions as Israeli troops left, including Sharm el-Sheikh. Its presence helped maintain quiet along the line and supported the withdrawal process.
UNEF operated on Egyptian territory with Egypt’s consent. It could observe, patrol and act as a buffer, but it had no authority to impose peace or guarantee navigation independently. The UN’s own records separate UNEF’s functions from the question of reopening the Canal and describe the force’s consent-based status. In May 1967, Egypt withdrew its consent and demanded UNEF’s departure; the force left, and Egypt again closed Tiran to Israeli shipping. The subsequent breakdown is traced in the decade before the Six-Day War.
What the arrangement achieved
Israel evacuated the Sinai and Gaza by March 1957. UNEF’s deployment and Egypt’s acceptance of international shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba produced a decade without another full-scale Israel-Egypt war. That quiet was real but conditional: it rested on Egyptian consent to UNEF and did not settle the underlying conflict. For the military sequence that preceded the withdrawal, read Operation Kadesh.