From 1957 to May 1967, UNEF’s deployment in Sinai and Gaza and Egypt’s restraint kept the Israel-Egypt front comparatively quiet. The arrangement depended on Egypt’s consent to the UN force and did not resolve the conflict. In May 1967, Egypt ordered UNEF out, moved forces into Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, ending the decade-long pause.
UNEF and the postwar line
Israel withdrew from Sinai and Gaza by March 1957. UNEF took positions on Egyptian territory and in Gaza with Egypt’s consent, providing a buffer and monitoring the cessation of hostilities. This reduced direct contact between the Egyptian and Israeli armies and helped suppress cross-border incidents. The arrangement did not constitute a peace treaty, and UNEF had no independent authority to remain if Egypt withdrew permission.
The campaign did not permanently end violence or settle the political conflict. Egypt retained the ability to change the arrangement, while disputes over access continued. The absence of another full-scale war between Israel and Egypt for ten years followed the post-1956 deployment and Egyptian restraint.
Egypt ended the arrangement in May 1967
In May 1967, Egypt asked UN Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw UNEF. The Secretary-General explained that the force could not remain on Egyptian territory without Egypt’s consent, and UNEF withdrew. Egypt then deployed forces in Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel had repeatedly said that renewed closure was a casus belli; the move brought the two countries into an immediate military crisis.
The crisis expanded as Egypt, Syria and Jordan coordinated military positions and hostile public rhetoric intensified. Israel attacked Egyptian airfields on 5 June 1967, beginning the Six-Day War. The 1957–67 calm therefore ended through a specific sequence: Egypt removed the buffer force, returned troops to Sinai and again blocked Israel’s access through Tiran. Read the Six-Day War account for what followed.
Why the arrangement was fragile
UNEF could observe and buffer; it could not compel Egypt to maintain the deployment or enforce open passage through the straits. The 1957 arrangement relied on political restraint and consent rather than an enforceable agreement. Its collapse in 1967 exposed that limit, while confirming that Israel had withdrawn from Sinai without securing a permanent mechanism for navigation. The earlier bargaining and withdrawal are explained in the 1957 withdrawal page.