Operation Kadesh began at 5 p.m. on 29 October 1956 with an Israeli paratroop drop near the eastern approaches to the Mitla Pass. Over the next days, IDF forces advanced across Sinai and captured Sharm el-Sheikh, opening the Gulf of Aqaba route to Eilat. The main fighting lasted about 100 hours, though the political and military withdrawal arrangements continued into 1957.
The Mitla Pass and advance across Sinai
The opening drop placed paratroopers near the Mitla Pass, west of the main Israeli advance. Other forces moved along routes through central and southern Sinai. At the pass, Israeli paratroopers later fought Egyptian forces in difficult terrain; the engagement was costly and was not simply a bloodless maneuver. The IDF’s history records the opening landing and subsequent advance, while the broader campaign chronology distinguishes the initial drop from the later fighting at the pass.
Israel’s plan used rapid movement to disrupt Egyptian forces and reach strategic points. Egyptian units withdrew or were overcome as Israeli forces advanced; British and French air and ground intervention began separately after their ultimatum, and should not be described as an Israeli air umbrella. Their aircraft struck Egyptian targets after 31 October.
Sharm el-Sheikh reopened the Gulf route
Israeli forces reached the southern tip of Sinai and captured Sharm el-Sheikh, which overlooked the Straits of Tiran. The position controlled the waterway into the Gulf of Aqaba, through which ships reached Eilat. The capture ended Egypt’s immediate ability to enforce the closure from that shore, and international shipping resumed through the straits.
Israel did not retain Sinai. Under UN-backed diplomacy, UNEF took over positions as Israeli troops withdrew in stages, including Sharm el-Sheikh. Israel completed withdrawal in March 1957 after stating that free navigation through Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba had to continue. UNEF supervised and served as a buffer with Egypt’s consent; it was not a permanent enforcement guarantee. Egypt closed the straits again in May 1967, triggering the next major crisis.
Military success and political limits
The campaign gave Israel a short-term security gain: Egyptian forces were pushed from the Sinai, fedayeen activity from the Gaza border was interrupted, and Eilat’s sea route reopened. It also involved a secret arrangement with Britain and France, whose intervention generated strong US and UN pressure. Israel withdrew rather than annex Sinai, and the arrangement’s durability depended on international presence and Egyptian consent. For the diplomatic outcome, see the 1957 withdrawal and UNEF.