International humanitarian law forbids using civilians to shield military objectives from attack. That prohibition does not remove an attacker’s duties: civilians remain protected, and every planned attack must distinguish military objectives from civilian people and objects, assess expected incidental harm, and take feasible precautions. A hospital, home or other civilian object does not become a lawful target solely because fighters are nearby.
What counts as using human shields
The ICRC’s customary-law study defines the prohibited practice as intentionally using civilians’ presence or movement to make military forces, points or areas immune from attack. It distinguishes this from mere co-location or failure to separate fighters from civilians: the relevant question includes whether civilians were intentionally placed or kept there to protect a military objective. The ICRC explains the rule and its application in Rule 97 on human shields.
Parties must, to the extent feasible, remove civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives. This obligation is set out in ICRC Rule 24. An opposing force’s violation does not turn civilians into combatants or erase the attacker’s legal duties.
What an attack still requires
Only military objectives may be deliberately attacked. A civilian object qualifies as a military objective only when, by its nature, location, purpose or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances at the time. Even then, an attack is prohibited if expected civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Those planning an attack must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize incidental harm.
The ICRC’s rules-of-war explanation summarizes distinction, proportionality and precaution. The presence of a human shield does not cancel these requirements, and the presence of military personnel near an object does not by itself change the object’s status.
Warnings and mitigation in practice
Advance warnings and evacuation routes can reduce civilian exposure when they are feasible and effective, but a warning does not make an otherwise unlawful attack lawful. The IDF says it uses phone calls, texts, leaflets and other channels to communicate evacuation recommendations and has established corridors and pauses. Those claims are relevant to assessing precautions; they do not settle the legality of any particular strike or prove genocidal intent absent.
For Israel’s description of those measures, see the IDF account of warnings, routes and civilian assistance. For the separate question of genocidal intent, see how mitigation evidence is assessed.