On June 12, 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The finding concerned Iran’s failure to answer questions about undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple locations; it was not a finding that Iran had violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. Israel launched Operation Rising Lion on June 13, and the United States separately struck Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 21–22.
What the IAEA could not verify
The IAEA’s May report described safeguards questions at several undeclared locations. Its overall assessment said available information pointed to an undeclared structured nuclear program carried out through the early 2000s at three locations, and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. The agency also said Iran had not supplied technically credible answers about uranium particles found at undeclared sites. It reported no credible indications of an ongoing undeclared structured program of that earlier type, while stressing that unresolved material-accounting questions prevented it from assuring that the current program was exclusively peaceful. The details are in the agency’s May 2025 safeguards report.
The report also said Iran was the only non-nuclear-weapon state then producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235, a level far above ordinary power-reactor fuel. Enrichment is not itself prohibited by the safeguards agreement; the IAEA’s concern was the scale and proliferation risk alongside missing explanations and verification gaps.
What the June 12 resolution said
Resolution GOV/2025/38 found that Iran’s failures since 2019 to cooperate fully and promptly over undeclared nuclear material and activities constituted non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. Separately, the Board found the agency could not verify that safeguarded material had not been diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It called on Iran to provide explanations, identify the location of material and equipment, and provide access needed for verification. Read the resolution’s operative text: it does not declare an NPT violation or conclude that Iran had built a nuclear weapon.
From censure to strikes
The Board’s resolution sharpened the diplomatic crisis but did not order military action. Israel said it acted against what it viewed as an advancing nuclear and missile threat; the IDF announced the start of Operation Rising Lion on June 13, targeting nuclear-related and military sites. The United States publicly said Israel had acted unilaterally. A week later, US forces carried out Operation Midnight Hammer against Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. The IDF’s opening briefing and the Pentagon’s June 22 account distinguish these operations and dates.
The IAEA’s post-strike reporting shows what remained unresolved: inspectors lost access to most facilities after the attacks, and the agency later said it had lost continuity of knowledge over current nuclear-material inventories. The September safeguards report makes clear why a strike could disrupt infrastructure without answering the verification questions that preceded it. For the specific US damage record, see Operation Midnight Hammer.