---
title: "The Override Clause: Could a Knesset Majority Overrule the Supreme Court?"
description: "A March 2023 bill proposed that 61 MKs could shield a law from review or reenact one struck down by the Supreme Court. Canada's notwithstanding clause applies to specified rights and expires after five years."
url: "https://hasbara.co.il/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/the-knesset-override-clause-and-israeli-judicial-power"
type: "resource-page"
locale: "en"
categories: ["Israeli Judicial Reform Debate 2023-2024"]
---

# The Override Clause: Could a Knesset Majority Overrule the Supreme Court?

*A March 2023 bill proposed that 61 MKs could shield a law from review or reenact one struck down by the Supreme Court. Canada's notwithstanding clause applies to specified rights and expires after five years.*

A bill that passed its first reading on March 14, 2023, proposed letting 61 of the Knesset's 120 members shield legislation from judicial review or reenact a law after the Supreme Court struck it down. The bill did not become law. Canada's notwithstanding clause is narrower in scope and duration.

## The March bill's proposed power

The March bill paired two changes. It would have limited the Supreme Court's power to strike down legislation to a full panel of 15 justices and a four-fifths majority. It also proposed an override declaration: 61 MKs could protect a law in advance or reenact one following a court ruling. The first-reading vote was 61–52. The [Israel Democracy Institute's March bill explainer](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/46387) describes its threshold and reach.

## How Canada's clause differs

Section 33 of Canada's Charter allows Parliament or a provincial legislature to declare expressly that a law operates despite section 2 or sections 7 through 15 of the Charter. Such a declaration expires after five years, though the legislature may reenact it. The [official Constitution Acts text](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/fulltext.html) sets out these limits. The proposed Israeli mechanism would have applied across a broader field of Basic Laws and included an advance shield; the March proposal did not include a comparable five-year sunset.

The comparison also has a different constitutional setting. Canada is a federation with a written Charter and provincial legislatures. Israel's proposal concerned the national Knesset and Basic Laws. The differences in rights covered, timing, and duration matter when comparing the two mechanisms. The [bill analysis](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/46387) sets out the Israeli proposal alongside the Canadian comparison.

## The limited override already in Israeli law

Israel already had a narrow override provision in section 8 of the Basic Law protecting the right to choose a profession. It applied only to laws that expressly stated they operated notwithstanding that Basic Law, required a majority of Knesset members, and normally expired after four years unless a shorter period was set. It did not authorize overriding any Basic Law or Supreme Court ruling generally. The [Israel Democracy Institute's account of the existing clause](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/23521) explains its restricted scope.

The March proposal therefore represented a substantial expansion from a right-specific mechanism to a broad power affecting judicial review. The proposal's first-reading passage did not enact that power.

## Pages

- [Israel's Constitutional Framework and the Judicial Reform Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/overview.md)
- [The Reasonableness Amendment and the January 2024 Supreme Court Rulings](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/the-reasonableness-standard-debate-in-israeli-judicial-reform.md)
- [Who Should Choose Israel's Judges? The Judicial Selection Committee Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/reforming-israel-s-judicial-selection-committee-the-2023-2024-debate.md)
- [Attorney General and Ministry Lawyers: The Proposed Changes](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/reforming-israel-s-government-legal-advisors-and-attorney-general.md)
- [Protests, Reservists, and the 2023 National Cohesion Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/idf-reservist-protests-and-israel-s-national-security-debate.md)
- [Herzog's Mediation and the Economic Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/the-president-s-mediation-and-compromise-frameworks-in-israel.md)

## Sources

- [en.idi.org.il](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/46387)
- [en.idi.org.il](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/23521)
- [laws-lois.justice.gc.ca](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/fulltext.html)
