---
title: "Who Should Choose Israel's Judges? The Judicial Selection Committee Debate"
description: "The existing nine-member committee combines ministers and lawmakers with judges and bar representatives. The January, February, and March 2023 proposals each changed its membership or voting rules; none became law."
url: "https://hasbara.co.il/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/reforming-israel-s-judicial-selection-committee-the-2023-2024-debate"
type: "resource-page"
locale: "en"
categories: ["Israeli Judicial Reform Debate 2023-2024"]
---

# Who Should Choose Israel's Judges? The Judicial Selection Committee Debate

*The existing nine-member committee combines ministers and lawmakers with judges and bar representatives. The January, February, and March 2023 proposals each changed its membership or voting rules; none became law.*

Israel's Judicial Selection Committee appoints judges to all courts, including the Supreme Court. Before the 2023 proposals, it had nine members: two ministers, two Knesset members, three Supreme Court justices, and two Israel Bar Association representatives. The proposals changed the political and professional balance and the votes needed for appointments; none passed final readings in 2023.

## The existing committee and thresholds

The justice minister chairs the committee, alongside another minister, two lawmakers, three Supreme Court justices, and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association. The President of Israel formally appoints the judges selected by the committee. Under the existing arrangement, five votes were needed for ordinary court appointments. Supreme Court appointments required seven of nine votes under a 2008 amendment to the Courts Law, encouraging agreement across committee groups. The Knesset's [Basic Law: The Judiciary](https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/documents/BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawTheJudiciary.pdf) sets out the constitutional appointment framework.

## How the 2023 drafts evolved

Justice Minister Yariv Levin's January proposal would have given the coalition an effective majority. A February bill would have removed the two bar representatives, added a third minister, and provided for two coalition lawmakers and one opposition lawmaker. It would have lowered the appointment threshold from seven votes to five. The [Law Library of Congress review](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2023555902/2023555902.pdf) tracks the proposal and its legislative history.

On March 27, a revised draft advanced for final readings. It proposed an 11-member committee with six government-bloc members and no Bar Association representatives. It also proposed changes to selection of the Supreme Court president and deputy. This was a separate draft from the February bill, and it never received final Knesset readings in 2023. The [Israel Democracy Institute's explanation of committee membership](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/49939) provides context for the existing system.

## What the changes meant

Supporters sought a stronger elected role in selecting judges, arguing that courts wielded substantial authority while judges were not directly elected. Opponents emphasized the professional participation of judges and bar members and the cross-group agreement required for Supreme Court appointments. Under the March draft, a five-vote threshold would have shifted appointment power; rules for lower courts also included bloc representation conditions, so every appointment would not simply have been decided by an unrestricted majority.

The drafts should be treated separately: the January announcement, the February bill, and the March revision did not create one final proposal. The July reasonableness amendment did become law, but the appointment plan did not. The [April 2023 legislative review](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2023555902/2023555902.pdf) records those distinctions.

## Pages

- [Israel's Constitutional Framework and the Judicial Reform Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/overview.md)
- [The Reasonableness Amendment and the January 2024 Supreme Court Rulings](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/the-reasonableness-standard-debate-in-israeli-judicial-reform.md)
- [The Override Clause: Could a Knesset Majority Overrule the Supreme Court?](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/the-knesset-override-clause-and-israeli-judicial-power.md)
- [Attorney General and Ministry Lawyers: The Proposed Changes](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/reforming-israel-s-government-legal-advisors-and-attorney-general.md)
- [Protests, Reservists, and the 2023 National Cohesion Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/idf-reservist-protests-and-israel-s-national-security-debate.md)
- [Herzog's Mediation and the Economic Debate](/resources/israeli-judicial-reform-debate-2023-2024/the-president-s-mediation-and-compromise-frameworks-in-israel.md)

## Sources

- [en.idi.org.il](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/49939)
- [m.knesset.gov.il](https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/documents/BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawTheJudiciary.pdf)
- [tile.loc.gov](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2023555902/2023555902.pdf)
